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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s reconciliation policies have gained increasing prominence within the European 
Union’s (EU) social agenda. Allegedly, such policies have been considered central for promoting 
gender equality, but they have also been framed as a way of increasing labour market participation of 
mothers as well as strengthening their social inclusion. According to the EU social policy model, as 
depicted in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, two ambitions considering gender equality have received 
special attention, namely equal opportunities between women and men and the employment levels of 
parents through active and preventive approaches of social policy.
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 However, academic observers have 
argued that gender equality focus is increasingly losing ground in favour of employment imperatives 
(e.g. Jenson, 2009). Stratigaki (2004: 30) for instance, has described how the meaning of 
reconciliation of working and family life concepts inherent in the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) has gradually shifted from a gender equality perspective (sharing responsibilities between men 
and women) to a market-oriented objective (encouraging flexible forms of employment) (Lewis, 2006, 
Lewis et al., 2008, Graziano et al., 2011a). Moreover, the recent EU2020 strategy has framed the 
reconciliations issue in a new light. Through targeted investments in poor families and expected future 
returns through human capital investments in early childhood education and child care services 
(ECEC), a new EU-driven approach to reconciliation policies seems to be emerging (Lundvall and 
Lorenz, 2012). But what are the actual implications of these changing ideas for the discourses on 
reconciliation of work and family on a member-state level?  
The aim of this article is to investigate government-level discourses on work/family 
reconciliation policies in two European countries, Finland and the Netherlands, since the mid-1990s, 
and to discuss the impact that EU ideas and policy recommendations have played for these discourses 
and policies suggested by the governments gaining the office. The term discourse denotes the ways 
that governments have interpreted the meaning of work/family reconciliation, and how such policies 
have been framed. Consequently, three research questions can be singled out. First, to what extent 
have work/family reconciliation ideas found their way into coalition agreements in the two countries 
since the mid-1990s? Second, do these national discourses relate mainly to gender equality, 
employment promotion, or social inclusion? Third, can the discursive developments be said to follow 
path-dependent traits or is there trace of growing convergence between the countries towards the 
European ideal? In order to analyse the national interpretation and implementation of reconciliation 
imperatives, national policy documents were analysed for a time period ranging from the Mid-1990s 
until present date.  
This article contributes to the academic discussion in at least two ways. First, it deconstructs the 
usage of reconciliation policies in national policy discourses by identifying different policy objectives 
observed ta EU level, such as gender equality, labour market mobilisation and social inclusion. While 
previous work have mostly focussed on the first two objectives, or only on social inclusion, few 
studies, if any, have investigated the role that these three objectives of discourse play within member-
state policy discourses. Second, the article compares two European countries that, due to their high 
2 
 
female labour market participation, have often been praised as two very different model countries in 
terms of reconciliation, but that have seldom been subjected to comparison.  
The paper is structured in the following way. The next two sections provide the theoretical 
framework for the analysis. The following section presents the data and methods used for the analysis 
and the penultimate section presents the finding. In the last section, the findings are discussed 
alongside a number of conclusions. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1. Unravelling the different levels of reconciliation policy discourse 
 
This paper draws on the theory of discursive institutionalism arguing that institutions and their 
inherent discourses provide means and rationales for certain types of political action while 
simultaneously blocking other types of behaviour. For example, Vivian Schmidt (2008) argues that 
ideas and elite discourses constitute the very core of policymaking since it generates cognitive ideas 
about what should be done as well as normative ideas, how these ideas can be put in action. Politics is, 
after all, as proposed by Hugh Heclo (1974), a game, where actors need to know what to do (cognitive 
ideas) and how to break opposition (normative ideas) to push forward the preferred solutions. 
It has been suggested that the importance of dominant ideas set out by supra-national agencies, 
such as the European Union, has grown in the era of new welfare state politics (Heidenreich and 
Zeitlin, 2009). Policy ideas and policy discourses generated by the EU may assist policy makers in 
finding solutions to national problems (cf. Graziano et al 2011)
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. Previous research has shown that, 
also in the area of reconciliation policies, domestic actors may use of European ideas in framing 
domestic reforms in pursuit of their own agenda (Graziano et al., 2011a). Domestic actors may, 
furthermore, appropriate and redefine the European guidelines to advance their own agenda (Stiller 
and van Gerven, 2012, Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009), they can break opposition by using Europe 
(often as scapegoat) to legitimate their own political preferences (Stiller, 2006), or obtain EU 
resources to implement policy innovations that would otherwise be unaffordable (Verschraegen et al., 
2011, van Gerven et al., forthcoming). The ideational effect of Europe has been considered salient in 
the current era of policy making where new social risks and the demographic transformation of 
European societies are compelling member states to change the focus of the welfare states. This ‘post-
national’ constellation has increased the level of uncertainty and diminished the scope of national 
policy manoeuvrability. One solution in the recent years has been the European Union’s social 
investment paradigm which has received wide attention on a national level (Morel et al. 2012). This 
agenda emphasises that social policies should focus on investments in human capital  and aim for 
social inclusion and poverty reduction among families. Regardless of these omnipotent pressures 
catalysed by European integration process, welfare state literature has long advocated that the goals of 
national social policies are (and remain to be) formulated on the ational arena, where domestic interest, 
resources and feedback mechanisms prevail. Particularly, reconciliation policies are suggested to 
follow existing (and differing) patterns of labour market behaviour and attitudes towards parental 
involvement in work and care (Lewis et al., 2008, Morgan, 2009). It is thus an empirical question, to 
what extent domestic discourse on reconciliation policies, and policy practices introduced mirror that 
of EU level, and how this varies in two welfare states with drastically different interests and traditions 
embedded in the reconciliation policies. 
  
2.2. Linking governmental discourse with reconciliation policies 
 
Previous research on reconciliation policies has shown that this policy area is rich with regard to its 
meaning, orientation and evolution (Graziano et al., 2011b, Knijn and Smit, 2009). At the level of 
national policies, reconciliation policies traditionally include a wide range of policy instruments, from 
maternity leave arrangements, cash transfers (i.e. child allowance) and recently also in-work tax 
benefits, to ECEC services. For reasons of analytical clarity, this article focuses on three principle 
areas of reconciliation policies (Graziano et al., 2011b: 36): family-related leave, child care and 
provision of child care services (formal or informal care), and working conditions.  On the EU 
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level, reconciliation policies originate from policies related to equal treatment, but in the last decades 
the concept of reconciliation has been widened as to include also occupational equality and 
employment promotion (Graziano et al., 2011b). According to the EU 2020 agenda, also policy 
themes pertaining to social inclusion and social investment strategies have been increasingly viewed 
as central parts of the reconciliation concept (EC 2010.).  
From the vast literature on gender equality we have constructed a theoretical model for the 
understanding of reconciliation of work and family discourses and their respective policy types that 
will guide the empirical analysis (table 1). The three dominant ideas of reconciliation diffusing from 
the EU level are 1) equal treatment and equal opportunities, 2) employment/occupational equality and 
increasing female labour market participation, 3) social inclusion and investing in human capital.  
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The ‘equal opportunities’ discourse has been largely influenced by feminist ideas and strategies. From 
the onset of this discourse in the early 1970s, the focus was put most squarely on care workers’ 
contributions to the national economy and to issues of gender inequality caused by women’s 
disproportionate burden of child bearing and care (Stratigaki 2004). Very quickly, however, the tone 
towards gender equality was made to parallel to the imperative of reconcile work/family reconciliation. 
Although women’s employment has been central in the discourse on equal treatment and opportunity, 
this framing addressed mainly the gender-based inequality within the primary labour market
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(Stratigaki 2004: 50). The ambition to achieve an equal sharing of family and domestic tasks between 
women and men, has  mainly hinged on egalitarian arrangements that make parental leave transferable 
between mothers and fathers, increase quality of care provision (and access to it) and prevents any 
discrimination based on gender or family status.  
Whereas the equal opportunity approach strives at equal treatment and opportunities of men and 
women, or at least to correct grievances for women in the primary labour market, the discourse 
embedding the occupational equality and employment promotion approach stems from a mounting 
public need to increase the capacity of women to work (at the secondary labour market) (Stratigaki 
2004: 45). Here the dominance of economic priorities seems quite central. Also higher labour market 
flexibility is a central starting point in these kinds of policies. Policy solutions no longer include 
measures extending family leaves; rather they advocate accessible and affordable care (with implicitly 
emphasising the criteria on quantity of care places) and flexible working conditions.  
The discourse on social inclusion centres around equality of opportunity through increased 
investments in human capital as well as more enabling and preventive social protections systems. Such 
a discourse is proposed to be more child-oriented than oriented towards mothers (Esping-Andersen 
and Vandenbrucke, 2002). It focuses  primarily on distributing life chances and income over the life 
cycle for children by emphasising human capital formation (ECEC), and only secondly on the human 
capital maintenance (lifelong learning) of adults/parents which is also something that is seen as 
essential for the social inclusion). Increasing employment rates for women and the social inclusivist 
discourse which is inherent in reconciliation policies has a two-fold aim. First, the reconciliation of 
work and family policy is seen as means for combatting poverty and social exclusion of women. 
Secondly, life-course investments in human capital are central for reaching the EU-wide shared 
ambition to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 
Policy measures attained to this discourse are preventive and targeted policies against social exclusion 
and (state) led support to invest in early childhood education and childcare services (Morel et al. 2012: 
2). 
To empirically analyse the impact of these kinds of ideas on national-level discourses is 
naturally not straightforward. Not only is hard to determine the actual degree of impact of such ideas, 
but they are often also overlapping. For instance, as Jenson has argued recently, in context of the EU 
social investment strategies, an ambition to create stronger work incentives for women has been 
framed as a way of improving gender equality (Jenson 2009). Furthermore, both occupational equality 
and social investment discourses prioritise labour market participation, activation and flexibilisation of 
the labour market. Nevertheless, the three theoretically derived paradigms outlined in table 1 can serve 
as a heuristic tool for analysing national discourses on reconciliation of work and family life since the 
mid-1990s. The qualitative differences between each model sketched in Table 1 guide us in our 
analysis to what extent we can establish these three distinct (yet sometimes overlapping) models or 
reconciliation discourses at the level of the two welfare states.  
 
3. Methods 
 
Institutionalist-driven analyses often focus on the systematic comparison of a small number of country 
cases as well as the contextualisation and holistic interpretation of social phenomena within these 
cases (Ragin, 1987). In this article Finland and the Netherlands serve as cases for assessing 
reconciliations discourses. Regardless of the fact that  these countries are often portrayed as success 
stories of high female employment rates, the two countries in fact represent different welfare regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990) with rather different ways of understanding the relation between the family 
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and the labour market as well as the need for reconciliation practices (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). Finland 
has traditionally supported a dual-earner model with high levels female full-time work through a broad 
coverage of public care services, but also acknowledged the right for mother to choose to stay home 
with their small children. In contrast, the male-breadwinner model has traditionally had a stronger 
foothold in the Netherlands, yet recently the part-time work has become a norm for many mothers. 
Due to these differences, the two countries can serve as a fruitful starting point for assessing the role 
that national welfare institutions and policy legacies play for the adoption of influential ideas on 
family policies. 
In order to analyse country-level discourses on reconciliation and to elucidate the impact of ideas and 
policy recommendations from the EU, coalition contracts ranging from the mid-1990s until present 
date were analysed. As a way of putting the analyses into context, we also discuss the main policy 
changes that have taken place in each country.  
The method used for our analysis is qualitative content analysis, which Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005) defines as a ‘research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data 
through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and 
Shannon 2005, p. 1278). This is a rather unproblematic way or analysing textual contents that allows 
both qualitative interpretation as well as quantification. We have used a deductive variant of the 
method, which means that the analyses of programs were conducted on the basis of three discursive 
paradigms displayed in table 1, that is, to what extent and in which ways elements from the paradigms 
could be found in coalitions programs.  
The collected coalition programs consisted of five Finnish and seven Dutch coalition 
agreements ranging from the Mid-1990s until present date. Due to sheer volume, the focus of the 
analysis is placed squarely on the political elite level, i.e. the government level. This allows us to draw 
only a general picture of the changes in political elite discourses on reconciliation, and to merely 
conduct a general assessment of the ideational impact that the EU level may have had on these 
discourses. Moreover, the analysis cannot say anything about the effects that these discourses have on 
actual policies or policy outcomes. 
 
4. Results  
 
 
The Dutch reconciliation regime 
 
Regardless of the reforms introduced in the last decades, the Dutch conservative model of male 
breadwinner family remains strong. To support the working parents, The Netherlands has combined 
short parental leave with provision of (part-time) child care services. The maternity leave period is 
also short (currently 16 weeks), which causes many parents, predominantly mothers to either stop 
working or work less hours after the maternity leave. As Thévenon (2011: 72) has observed, the Dutch 
tax system is not designed to encourage full labour market participation of both parents. 
 
 
Most important reforms 1990-2012 
 
The Dutch government started to develop formal child care provision at the end of the 1980s via 
subsidies to providers of childcare (Lewis et al 2008: 272). In the early 1990, largely as an answer to 
the increasing entry of women to the labour market (see also Visser, 2002), a formalisation of the child 
acre provision was achieved by The PvDA (labour) party (Regeerakkoord, 1998). The law, however, 
passed the parliament only under the Christian Democrats-Liberal coalition with Christen Democrats 
(CDA), Liberals (VVD) and populist Pim Fortuijn Party (LPF) in 2002. As van Hooren and Becker  
(2012: 99) have explained, the law radically changed child care provision as subsidies no longer went 
from municipalities to day care centres, but directly to parents who could choose between a guest 
parent or a private (or non profit) organisation organised  day care facilities. From 2007 employers 
were made responsible for bearing parts of the costs of child care together with their employees and 
the state. As parental payments declined to 19 % of real child care costs (in average) in 2009, the use 
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of child care increased substantially in the second half of the 2000s (van Hooren and Becker 2012: 99). 
Very soon the cost of childcare extended those anticipated and the Balkenende IV government with 
Christen democrats (CDA), Liberals (VVD), Christen Union (CU) (2007-2010) – who also had 
implemented the law, implemented cutbacks in childcare policy. The Rutte I (2010-2012) government 
continued the hard line of its predecessor. The measures implemented included further cuts in child 
care subsidies (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, jaargang 2011, nr. 424). Reductions 
were made to subsidies to guest parent care as well as to those of formal day care (from to maximum 
hourly rate of €5) to families with high income. The cuts were justified by referring to the 
skyrocketing prices of the day care since the expansion of rights and raising the subsidies from 2007. 
The Flexibility and Security Act entered into force in 1999 and coined the attempts in the past to 
introduce more flexibility to the labour market. The Netherlands had already been rather successful in 
the mid 1990s in its attempt to increase the labour market participation of women. In the era that 
Visser and Hemerijck (1997) refers to as the period of Dutch miracle, employment indeed rose by 
average of 1.8 % over the period of 1990 and 1998. This growth was predominantly caused by the rise 
of the number of part-time working women (Visser, 2002). From 2001 onwards, all employees are 
able to request either a reduction to part-time to an increase to full-time hours. This law resonated with 
the governmental scenario ‘Combination scenario’ whereby both men and women would engage in 
paid and unpaid work (Commissie Toekomstscenario Herverdeling Onbetaalde arbeid 1997). A 
parental leave policy followed in 2001 (Work and Care Act) and although it left the parental leave 
unpaid for most workers
1
, take-up (of part-time care leave) among fathers has been relatively high (19 
per cent in 2005) (Lewis et al 273). Government introduced also in 2006, a new Life course savings 
scheme, that was supposed to encourage parents save of their wages to take time of caring for their 
children. The take-up of the programme was low from the commence of the programme (Lewis et al 
2008: 274), and despite the good intentions of equal treatment of genders, it proved to be a failure after 
one and half years of its existence (Bovenberg and Conneman 2007). In 2010 the government 
extended the legal parental leave (from 13 to 26 weeks for each parent), but left it unpaid. 
 
The reconciliation discourse of the Dutch Coalition agreements 
 
Table 2. An overview of main discursive threads in Dutch coalition agreements 1994-2012 
Agreement Coalition 
parties 
Discourse Specifics 
1994 ‘keuzes voor de 
toekomst’ 
Pvda, VVD, 
D66 
Employment promotion Encouragement of entry 
of women  
1998 ‘kracht’ PvDA, VVD, 
D66 
Gender equality and 
employment promotion 
Good economic growth, 
investment 
2002 ‘werken aan 
vertouwen’ 
CDA, LPF, 
VVD 
Employment promotion 
(with a freedom to choose) 
Decreasing economic 
growth, participation 
2003 ‘meedoen, meer 
werk, minder regels’ 
CDA, VVD, 
D66 
Employment promotion 
(with a freedom to choose) 
Lowering growth, more 
responsibility 
2007 ‘samen werken, 
samen leven’ 
CDA, PvDA, 
CU 
Employment promotion 
(with a freedom to choose), 
gender equality 
Millennium goals, 
participation 
2010 ‘vrijheid en 
verantwoordelijkheid’ 
CDA, VVD 
(PVV) 
Employment promotion 
(with a freedom to choose) 
participation and 
responsibitility 
2012 ‘bruggen slaan’ VVD, PvDA Employment promotion, 
some elements of (general) 
equal treatment and social 
investment 
 
Note: CDA=  Christen Democrats, PvDA = Labour, VVD = Liberals, D66 = progressive democrats, 
CU = Christen Union, PVV= Party for Freedom, LPF = List Pim Fortyin 
 
                                                          
1
 The civil servants received 75 percent compensation, others not 
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From start of the period of the analysis (1994) to date, the main discourse prevailing in Dutch coalition 
agreements has been that of employment promotion. Under periods of reasonably favourable 
economic conditions in the 1990s, most of the attention was directed towards an elimination of the 
structural bottlenecks hampering women to enter the labour market. The early employment promotion 
discourse was predominantly framed from the equal treatment perspective: Men and women need to 
have equal rights to be economically independent (1994 p.28). In the coalition agreement, the 
governing parties (The PVDA, VVD, D66) called upon measures to increase the number of jobs 
between segments of minimum income and the lowest collective labour agreements scales (p.6). This 
was the part of the job market, where particularly women could easily enter and this was facilitated by 
the government by providing job opportunities (such as so called Melkert job) at the secondary labour 
market (in line with our conceptualisation of labour promotion category). The gender equality 
perspective was subordinate to this discourse. The gender equality perspective does, however, tend to 
occur in the documents only prepared by a coalition including the Labour Party (PvDA) under a 
separate heading of emancipation.
4
  
Central to the Dutch female employment discourse is thus the idea of flexible labour markets 
and that citizen must be enabled to adapt their labour market participation in different phases of life. 
This was embodied in the life course perspective that was actively promoted in the coalition 
documents between 2002 and 2007. Such intention to maximise the choice of the individual remains 
typical for the Dutch reconciliation policies to date, as will discussed later. The analysis of coalition 
agreement shows that the freedom to choose to work (or, not to work) is highlighted in the documents 
prepared under Christian-Democratic (CDA) rule. Here, the employment promotion is called upon vis-
à-vis with protection of traditional family norms. For example, the coalition agreement of 2002 posited 
that men and women should have the freedom to choose to have different roles in life cycle, especially 
in relation to paid and unpaid work decision. This discourse driven by CDA resonates with its’ 
traditional norms and values that family is the corner stone of the society and consequently, in sake of 
the children, women should be able also to choose not to work. 
The decline of economic growth from the 2000s onwards and the surmounting Eurozone crisis 
does not seem to have largely changed the reconciliation discourse in the Netherlands. The emphasis 
has remained on the employment promotion of women, vis-à-vis favouring cash over services and 
maximising the choice of the individual in matter of reconciliation of family and work. Participation is 
increasingly at the core of the governmental discourse from the early 2000. Yet, not only gainful 
employment is understood under this term. Active participation of (grand)parents at schools and 
provision of informal child care are examples of 2010 coalition agreement how people should to find a 
good balance between paid work, care responsibilities, voluntary work, training and free time. 
Furthermore, flexible working times and working forms are underlined to provide enough possibilities 
to enable people to combine work with other activities. As example, flexibility was suggested in the 
document of 2010 by introducing more telework and home work  to help parents to combine work and 
care responsibilities (coalition agreement 2010: ADD pages).  
From 2010, self-responsibility of families became increasingly highlighted. In the midst of cuts 
in childcare provision, 2010 coalition agreement (ADD pages), for instance, posited that the cabinet 
thinks that child care supplements (by state to parents) should not weaken the own responsibility of the 
parents. And that more responsibilities are to be designed for parents (also financially) to the 
improvement of language proficiency of their children (2010: ADD pages). These tendencies go 
somewhat against the broader European trends towards state investments in early child hood education. 
In fact, the ‘social investment’ discourse has not yet found its way to the reconciliation discourse in 
the Netherlands. During the economically flourishing period (mid 1990s), governments announced 
several measures to increase child care services to improve the quality of child care and to liberate 
women to the employment in line with the employment promotion discourse. For instance, in 1998, 
the government announced an intensification programme to improving quality of education and 
increasing numbers of child care and after school care. (p.12). With  a fourfold growth of the day care 
capacities, and with focus on after school care supply, the coalition agreement (1998: 27) claims to 
have taken an important step towards better response to the current need as well the need in the future 
of day care services.  
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Even after the decline of economic growth and surmounting Eurocrisis, education was seen as 
one of the focal points of the governments.  However, emphasis on freedom of choice plays the first 
violin in this debate aiming at improving the quality of education: central state is seen to bear the 
responsibility to set the framework, where schools are free to make up their own substance. In the 
coalition agreement of 2003, straight references was made to acknowledge the importance of 
education for the society and economy at large, but no reference is made to the need to invest in the 
early childhood education. In 2007, investment in quality is highlighted, yet its interpretation stems 
from the need to provide freedom to choose for parents and children, more freedom to school to decide 
on the substance and ways of teaching: and in case of good performance of the schools, school may 
win more freedom from state (less strict monitoring). Only in the document of 2012, references to 
early child hood education and its importance for the society as a whole are included in the 
government strategy. This, however, is posited towards more stringent testing of pre pre-school 
children for their language proficiency and the necessity to invest more means to schools to improve 
the language education for the group of children. In many case these are targeted measures toward 
poor families, and especially those with migration backround. The targeting towards migrant families 
started already in 2002, when the populist Pim Fortyin party changed the political climate towards 
migration policy and multiculturalism. Ever after this, coalition agreementw refer to targeted inclusion 
of  migrant families. For example, in the document of 2007 children (of migrant families) with lacking 
language proficiency, are suggested to be guided to day care or peuterspeelzaal (a preschool play 
school) or in pre-school education (at the age of 4). These measures should be integrated with 
measures that aim at parents’s  integration (2007: P. 28). Social investment paradigm has thus not gain 
urgency at the Dutch governmental discourse, and under the current economic dire straits will remain 
a silent letter in the nearby future. 
 
The Finnish reconciliation regime 
 
The Finnish system for work/family reconciliation has focussed mainly on employment promotion of 
mothers through publicly-funded child day-care services, but it has also aimed at higher gender 
equality between parents as well as equal treatment of women and men in working life. This has 
brought with it a relatively high full-time female employment rate, approximately around 66-67 per 
cent of the whole female workforce, and a relatively low part-time female employment rate (below 20 
per cent).  
 
Most important reforms 1990-2012 
 
The Finnish reconciliation system did not become fully developed in a ‘Nordic’ sense until 
1996 when the childcare system became truly universal and started to cover all children under school-
age. The main motive behind the expansion of public childcare provision was to facilitate mothers’ 
employment in accordance with the European Employment Strategy, but also to curb the tendencies of 
rising child poverty among families with children (cf. Hiilamo, 2002). Simultaneously, in the early 
1990s cutbacks in family transfers were made as a part of the reform package seeking economic 
recovery and state financial sustainability. Among other things, the replacement rate of parental 
insurance allowances was lowered. It has been suggested that this reform was a part of an ideological 
shift from a ‘transfer-oriented’ towards a ‘employment-oriented’ paradigm within Finnish family 
policy during the 1990s, and that this shift was fuelled by the heyday of (European) third-way Social 
Democracy and the Finnish membership in the EU (cf. Nygård 2010). A year later, in 1997, the 
childcare reform was accompanied by the introduction of a whole new transfer to families with 
children, the private care allowance for children, which was meant to increase parents’ freedom to 
choose between public or private childcare. Interestingly, Finnish parents already had the chance to 
opt for home childcare instead of public day care through the so-called home care allowance system 
that was originally instituted in 1985. Originally this benefit was advocated by the Centre Party as a 
‘mothers wage’ compensating mothers for their domestic work, but in the 1990s it was increasingly 
seen as a way of relieving municipalities in their responsibility of providing public childcare to parents 
(Hiilamo and Kangas, 2009). The introduction of the private care allowance thus strengthened parents’ 
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choice of freedom in matters of childcare, but underneath it also drew heavily on employment 
promotion as well as an ambition to boost market-based childcare provision in Finland. Since the 
1990s, the Finnish reconciliation system has developed in a rather incremental way through piecemeal 
reforms of the family transfer system and the enactment of anti-discrimination legislation in 2004. The 
reforms conducted in the family transfer system, notably the parental insurance and the child benefit 
system, have largely aimed at two objectives; to increase the level of gender equality within the 
parental leave system through a larger up-take of fathers’ leave and to enhance the social inclusion of 
(poor) families with children, notably single-parent and multi-child families, through improvements of 
child benefits and child benefit supplements for single parents. The background for these reforms was 
the devaluation of purchasing power of families and the rising child poverty rate among families in the 
late-1990s and early-2000s (Lammi-Taskula and Salmi, 2010). This caused the Centre-left coalition 
led by Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, formed in 2003, to launch a series of ‘poverty packages’ 
consisting of piecemeal improvements of family transfers in 2004 and 2005. But alongside these 
improvements there was also a prolongation of the father’s leave to 30 weekdays under the condition 
that the father used 12 days of the mutual parental leave (Kuivalainen and Niemelä, 2010). At the 
same time (in 2004) the Parliament enacted the Law of equal treatment (2004/21) which prohibited all 
discrimination on the basis of gender, sexuality, ethnicity and age. The backdrop to this legislation was 
the policy imperatives set in motion by the EU Council directives on equal treatment (2000/43/EC) 
and on discrimination (2000/78/EC).   
Since the mid-2010s, the reforms conducted in the Finnish reconciliation system have continued 
to aim for higher female employment, gender equality and social inclusion. The ambition to enhance 
female employment is represented by the Finnish government’s attempts to start a renegotiation of the 
legal rights to public day care for every child under school age, and the idea of a restriction of the 
home care allowance so that it only applies to children under two years of age . As to gender equality, 
the 2007 improvements of the parental insurance system aimed at increasing the uptake of fathers’ 
leave by making the system more flexible, and in 2010 the fathers leave was extended to 36 days 
(STM, 2009). Among the reforms aiming for higher social inclusion of families, the piecemeal 
improvements of the child benefit system serve as good examples, where (Kuivalainen and Niemelä, 
2010).  
 
The reconciliation discourse of the Finnish Coalition agreements 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the Finnish government discourse on reconciliation policy has been strongly 
framed by employment promotion as a way of stabilising the Finnish economy in the aftermath of 
economic recession. The government programme launched by the Social Democratic coalition in 1995 
was firmly set on economic growth as well as structural reforms of the social protection schemes, 
notably unemployment benefits, in order to make the system more activating.  At the same time the 
need to make family policies and working life more ‘family friendly’ was emphasised through for 
example flexible working arrangements and flexible parental leaves.  Furthermore the government 
programme drew on EU principles  in promoting gender equality within Finnish working life as well 
as family life.  
 
Table 3. An overview of main discursive threads in Finnish government programs 1995-2011 
 
Agreement 
Coalition 
parties 
Discourse Specificies 
1995 ’Työllisyyden ja 
yhteisvastuun hallitus’ 
SDP, KOK, 
LW, GRE, 
SPP  
Employment promotion 
Gender equality in working 
life and family life 
Activation through a more 
spurring social protection 
scheme 
1999 ‘Oikeuden-
mukainen ja kannus-
tava - sosiaalisesti eheä 
Suomi’ 
SDP, KOK, 
LW, GRE, 
SPP 
Employment promotion, 
gender equality, social 
inclusion and anti-
discrimination policies 
Parents’ right to choose 
with regard to childcare 
2003 ‘Työllä, yrittä-
misellä ja 
CEN, SDP, 
SPP 
Employment promotion, 
gender equality in working 
Introduction of ‘fathers’ 
month’ within the parental 
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yhteisvastuulla uuteen 
nousuun’ 
life and family policy,  social 
inclusion through anti-
poverty measures and 
investments in human capital 
leave system 
2007 ‘Vastuullinen, 
välittävä ja kannus-tava 
Suomi’ 
CEN, KOK, 
GRE, SPP 
Employment promotion, 
gender equality,  social 
inclusion, investments in 
human capital 
More flexibility and 
incentives in family 
transfers and welfare 
services 
2011 ‘Avoin, 
oikeudenmukainen ja 
rohkea Suomi’ 
KOK, SDP, 
CHR, GRE, 
LW, SPP 
Employment promotion, 
gender equality  
Flexibility in childcare 
services and 
Note: SDP=Social Democrats, KOK=Conservatives, CEN=Centre Party, GRE=Greens, SPP=Swedish 
People’s Party, LW=Left-Wing Party, CHR=Christian Democrats 
 
This discursive thread was followed up by the next government which came into office in 1999 and 
was constituted by the same parties as its predecessor. Also in this programme gender equality in 
working life as well as in family life was put forth as an objective for the government, but it also 
contained a strong emphasis of the role of public welfare services for the overall employment rate as 
well as for the social inclusion of (poor) families, that is, work was considered the best remedy for 
child poverty. In this sense, this programme entailed a somewhat stronger emphasis on social inclusion 
than its predecessor, since day-care services and active labour market policies were not only seen as 
important for the labour market participation of parents, but also as a way of fighting poverty. The 
1999 government programme was the first of the programs after the 1990s-crisis to openly 
acknowledge child poverty (Nygård and Krüger, 2012). The programme also acknowledged the role of 
the anti-discrimination directive enacted through the Amsterdam Treaty as a way of preventing gender 
inequality. The parental leave system was seen as one of the areas where the objective towards gender 
equality should be put to test by granting fathers a ’daddy quota’ and thereby shifting care 
responsibilities more evenly between parents.  
In 2003 the coalition base shifted when the Centre Party regained office after eight years in 
opposition. However, by and large, this centre-left government followed in the footsteps of its 
predecessor by emphasising employment promotion and by pinpointing the role of reconciliation 
policies in this respect, especially when parental employment was concerned. The programme also 
accentuated the importance of gender equality in working life and saw the enactment of a new anti-
discrimination law as one major step towards this goal But also in family life the need to accomplish 
gender equality was seen as central, and the way to achieve this was seen to induce fathers to take 
longer leaves with their children and to redistribute the financial burdens of the parental insurance 
system more evenly between female- and male-dominated employment branches. Notwithstanding the 
fact that preschool education had been introduced already in 2001, the creation of human capital 
among children through welfare services and educational services were now seen as ways of achieving 
social inclusion and better life chances for children over the life cycle. Furthermore, piecemeal 
improvements of the child benefit and home-care allowance systems as well as the parental insurance 
allowance were seen as central for curbing poverty among families, notably lone-parent households.  
Also the centre-right government coming into office in 2007 drew heavily on reconciliation as 
an instrument for employment promotion, gender equality and poverty reduction, but the focus on 
human capital formation in terms of preschool education and childcare as well as activation through 
more flexible and effective family transfers were somewhat more accentuated in this programme. Like 
its predecessor also this government saw the exclusion of poor families as devastating to society as a 
whole and the economy in particular, which is why piecemeal improvements of the family transfer 
system were called for. But also the public childcare system was seen as being in need of reform. Not 
only should the system allow parents to choose the form of child care they think is best, but the 
flexibility of part-time care was to be improved in order to facilitate a smooth balance between work 
and family life.  
The Conservative-led six-party coalition coming into office in 2011 strongly set out to 
strengthen the financial sustainability of the Finnish welfare state in the wake of the financial crisis by 
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increasing the overall employment level and prolonging working lives of Finns. Similar to previous 
programmes, reconciliation policies were given a central position in the realization of these ambitions, 
but they were also seen as crucial for the achievement for gender equality. The accentuation of 
reconciliation policies was in fact stronger in this programme than in any of the previous programmes 
studied here. Early childhood education and care were seen as crucial not only for the combination of 
work and family life, but also for raising the overall employment levels and thereby securing the long-
term financial sustainability of the welfare system. Although the legal right to public childcare was 
defended, there were also claims for making the system more flexible, notably when it comes to part-
time care. Also the use of child home care was seen in a somewhat more critical light than before since 
it was mentioned that the system ought to be made more flexible and encouraging for parents to take 
up part-time jobs. Allegedly, the system was thought of as a potential obstacle to parental employment, 
although this was not said out loud in the programme.  
As a whole, although being considered important to employment and gender equality already in 
the 1990s, reconciliation policies became increasingly and explicitly emphasised as drivers of 
economic growth, gender equality, social inclusion and family friendliness in the 2010s. Mostly they 
have been associated with employment promotion and gender equality, whereas reconciliation policies 
became seen as drivers of social inclusion only in the 2010s. There seems to have been no major 
differences between the governments as to their ideological composition, instead the discursive 
framing of reconciliation tend to have been quite stable over time and conditioned more by contextual 
factors such as soaring poverty rates or sluggish growth.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This article set out to investigate government-level discourses on work/family reconciliation in two 
European countries, Finland and the Netherlands, since the mid-1990s. On the basis of our research 
questions and the theoretical framework the following conclusions can be made. 
First, regarding to the question to what extent have work/family reconciliation policies found 
their way into coalition agreements in the two countries since the mid-1990s, it was found that in both 
countries, reconciliation policies are of  importance for the governmental strategy for sustainable 
welfare states and a necessity for economic growth.  
Second, regarding to the question whether these national discourses relate mainly to gender 
equality, employment promotion, or social inclusion, it was found out that, by and large, employment 
promotion is the main discourse across countries as well as across time. Both countries strive at 
high(er) labour market participation of women and reconciliation policies are a crucial instrument to 
achieve this. The countries show, however, differences with respect to the underlying principles that 
guide the employment promotion practices. Whereas Finland strive to inclusion of women to the 
primary labour market by means of promotion of equal treatment of women and men, the Netherlands 
promotes the freedom of choice of the parents flexible working arrangements and (part) time care. The 
policy instruments coming out of these political discourse thus tend  to be circumscribed by 
established policy traditions in each country.  
Therefore, and regarding to the third question examining whether the discursive developments 
follow path-dependent traits or whether there is traceable convergence between the countries over time 
towards the contemporary European ideal (of social investment), it can be concluded that both 
countries have adopted the EU’s ambition of rising labour market participation rates, but national 
flavours on how reconciliation of family and employment responsibilities are still very much prevalent 
in the policy documents. The Dutch aim at organising flexible arrangements for mothers, and follows 
thus very much the continental one and half breadwinner model, whereas the Finnish tradition based 
on universal social democratic model centres around the equal treatment of men and women. Hardly 
any references were made to European Union in these contexts. 
It appears, however, that party politics play a role in the discourses, particularly in the 
Netherlands. In Dutch government coalitions where the Labour party have been present, more attempt 
have been made towards formalisation of public day care and emancipation of women, following the 
social democratic tradition. At the same time, coalitions including Christian democrats have 
predominantly emphasised the freedom of choice (to stay at home with children). Following the leftist 
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political leaders within European Union (predominantly the French president Holland), the Labour 
party in the Netherlands has also recently attempted to raise the issue of social investment on the 
political agenda. In the Dutch context, however, most of the social investment tends to be targeted 
towards migrant families, as legacy of the Pim Fortuin’s backflash towards (inadequate) migration 
policies in the Netherlands. A child-centred approach, as central to the EU’s understanding of social 
investment strategy has thus not been adopted in the Netherlands as a national (universal) strategy. In 
Finland, early childhood education has been on the agenda for decades. It is, however, evident from 
the documents analysed that the current social investment strategy tends to materialise as selective 
policies: extra investments are targeted to low income families. 
The three perspectives to reconciliation discourses sketched in our theoretical section are not 
without problems as some of them tend to overlap (as in the Finnish case where employment 
promotion and gender equality are difficult to separate from each other). It, however, was useful for 
conceptual purposes and application of it allowed us conduct a comparative analysis of two countries 
with common goal, but very different values and norms underlying the reconciliation policies. 
Furthermore, the social investment is still a rather recent agenda and it has not yet had time to 
materialise in the member state’s discourse and policy practices.  
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1
Between 1998 and 2002, the annual employment guidelines posited four pillars for member state to follow in 
their modernisation process; namely adaptability, entrepreneurship, equal opportunities and employability. 
Gender equality was also embodied by the gender mainstreaming policy commitment of Article 8 TFEU ‘In all 
its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality between men and women’. 
2
 EU has become an important actor in the area of work and family; primarily due to the active lobbying of 
feminist groups and the continuing effort of European Commission to expand the competences of the EU 
(Morgan, 2009: 52). 
3
 The primary labor market generally consists of high-wage paying jobs, longer lasting careers and the workers 
are covered with generous social security arrangements.  This in contrast to the secondary labor market, which 
consists of low-wage paying jobs, limited job-mobility, and the workers’s social protection is poor if existent. 
4
 In these documents (1994, 1998, 2007) emancipation is framed more broadly than just catching up women of 
men at the labour market.
4
 Emancipation is seen by Labour governments to necessitate changes in division of 
tasks between men and women. With a reference to UN Womens’ treaty, and to the report of commission 
Groenman, 1998 coalition agreement (by PvDA, VVD, D66) )for example called for gender equality by 
remarking that the increasing labour market participation of women has not been compensated with increasing 
participation of men in the unpaid caring tasks. 
